Sandor Radai v. First Transit by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-30-2012 
Sandor Radai v. First Transit 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Sandor Radai v. First Transit" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1080. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1080 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2560 
_____________ 
 
SANDOR RADAI;  
MICHAEL O'BRIEN, 
 
                 Appellants 
v. 
 
FIRST TRANSIT; FIRSTGROUP AMERICA COMPANY;  
FIRSTGROUP AMERICA; JOHN DOES (1-5). 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1-10-cv-06810) 
District Judge:  Hon. Joseph E. Irenas 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
March 08, 2012 
 
 BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, and SCIRICA, AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 30, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Sandor Radai and Michael O’Brien appeal the District Court’s order dismissing 
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the claim they brought against the defendant/employer for wrongful termination.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will affirm.1
I. 
 
 As we write primarily for the parties, we need not discuss the factual background 
or procedural history of this appeal.  
 First Transit argues that Radai and O’Brien’s claim is preempted by Sections 7 
and 8 of the NLRA based on the Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego Building Trades 
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).  The rule of Garmon—known as  “Garmon 
preemption”—precludes a claim where “it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the 
activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by [§] 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under [§] 8.”  Id. at 244.  Section 7 of 
the NLRA protects the right of employees to “self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. § 157.  Similarly, Section 8 of the NLRA 
prohibits labor practices that “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise 
of the rights guaranteed in section 7 . . . or discriminat[e] in regard to hire or tenure of 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action based on diversity of citizenship 
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
     We exercise plenary review of a grant of a motion to dismiss.  We therefore accept all 
allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.  United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 
1999).   
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employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization.”  29 U.S.C. § 158.   
We have stated that “Garmon preemption protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
NLRB over unfair labor practice proceedings; accordingly, if a cause of action implicated 
protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA or conduct that would be 
prohibited as an unfair labor practice under Section 8 of the NLRA, the cause of action is 
preempted.”  Voilas v. General Motors Corp., 170 F.3d 367, 378 (3d Cir. 1999).  Radai 
and O’Brien have alleged that they were involved in organizing a labor union and their 
employers terminated them in order to discourage labor organization within the plant.                        
They attempt to dodge the Garmon bullet that is fatal to their claim by arguing that they 
are seeking recovery for the employers’ breach of an implied contract, rather than 
recovery for a wrongful termination claim under the NLRA.  
However, their claim is nothing more than a rather transparent attempt to recast 
the employer’s alleged anti-union activity in terms of contract law.  Their efforts to seek 
representation from a labor union and the allegations that the employers hindered that 
activity fall squarely within the protections afforded by Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.  
Because the claim relates to activity described in Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA, the 
claim is clearly preempted under Garmon.  Thus, the District Court properly dismissed 
the Complaint.  
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
